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Utah Manufacturers Association, Utah Petroleum Associa-
tion and Utah Mining Association appear as amici curiae, pursuant 
to an Order of this Court dated November 4, 1988, and file this 
brief to assist the Court in its review of this matter. 
ISSUE 
Whether it is in the public interest for the Industrial 
Commission of Utah to usurp legislative authority by granting 
itself the power to award an applicant attorneys1 fees in addi-
tion to, rather than out of, the applicant's award in Workers1 
Compensation cases, where to do so is not authorized by statute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision handed down by the Industrial Commission 
in the instant case violated both the Workers' Compensation Act 
and the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. There is no statu-
tory authority that permits the Industrial Commission to impose 
the payment of an applicant's attorneys' fees upon the employer. 
The Utah Legislature has considered the issue and has chosen not 
to grant the Commission such authority. The law in Utah is thus 
that an applicant's attorneys' fees cannot be shifted to the 
employer. As a matter of public policy, the Industrial Commis-
sion should not be allowed to legislate authority which has been 
denied it by the sole body which does have power to legislate. 
-1-
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION LACKS STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE A FEE SHIFTING SCHEME 
AND THEREFORE ITS ACTION IS ULTRA VIRES AND 
ILLEGAL, 
The Utah Industrial Commission, as a creature of stat-
ute, has only those powers given it by the Legislature, It has 
no authority to create new benefits for an applicant or to impose 
new liabilities against an employer. One statutory provision, 
S 35-1-87, Utah Code Ann., gives the Commission limited authority 
with respect to attorneys' fees: 
In all cases coming before the Indus-
trial Commission in which attorneys have been 
employed, the commission is vested with full 
power to regulate and fix the fees of such 
attorneys. 
This statutory provision certainly cannot be construed 
as a fee shifting provision which would grant the Commission 
authority to impose the payment of an applicant's attorneys' fee 
upon the employer or its insurance carrier. Rather, the statute 
applies only to the fixing of the amount of attorneys' fees and 
does not authorize the assessment of attorneys' fees as costs 
against either party. This position was clearly set forth by the 
1 The Commission properly exercised its power to fix attor-
neys' fees by establishing a rule allowing contingency fee agree-
ments subject to a maximum ceiling, with attorneys' fees deducted 
from an applicant's award. 
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Utah Supreme Court in Graham v. Industrial Commission, 495 P. 2d 
806 (Utah 1972). Thus, consistent with the longstanding public 
policy of this state, the Commission has no statutory authority 
to establish a fee shifting scheme imposing upon an employer an 
obligation to pay an applicant's attorneys' fees. When it did so 
in the case at bar, it acted wholly without authority and its 
action was thus entirely illegal. 
II. BY VIRTUE OF ITS DECISION IN THE INSTANT 
CASE, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS ENGAGED 
IN RULEMAKING WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT. 
The Industrial Commission must follow the provisions of 
the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. That Act specifies cer-
tain situations when an agency must take action in the form of 
rulemaking. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. S 63-46a-3(2) states: 
In addition to other rulemaking required 
by law, each agency shall make rules when 
agency action: 
(a) authorizes, requires, or 
prohibits an action; 
(b) provides or prohibits a 
material benefit; 
(c) applies to a class of persons 
or another agency; and 
(d) is explicitly or implicitly 
authorized by statute. 
Emphasis added. 
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The Commission has provided a material benefit to the 
applicant in the instant case by awarding attorneys' fees to the 
2 
applicant in addition to his award. By doing sof the Commission 
has circumvented and violated the Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. 
By not following the rulemaking procedure, the Commis-
sion has denied all employers in the State of Utah the opportu-
nity to request and appear at a public hearing, to petition the 
agency not to adopt the rule and finally, to contest the rulemak-
ing proceedings. Such a denial is not consistent with the public 
policy of this state regarding rulemaking which the Legislature 
has established. 
III. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS ADDRESSED AND 
REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF GRANTING ATTORNEYS1 
FEES IN ADDITION TO, RATHER THAN OUT OF, A 
CLAIMANT'S AWARD IN WORKERS1 COMPENSATION 
CASES. 
Historically, the resolution of public policy issues, 
such as the issue in the instant case, has been entrusted to the 
elected legislative branch. For the executive branch to encroach 
upon this legislative responsibility violates the separation of 
powers, a basic constitutional concept. One legal scholar has 
noted: 
2
 In fact, the Industrial Commission now routinely reserves 
the issue of attorneys' fees payable in addition to an award 
until a final decision is rendered in this case. 
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The Utah Supreme Court consistently has 
held that attorney's fees may be recovered 
only where there is a statutory or contrac-
tual basis therefor. As the Tenth Circuit 
explained, "The right to recover attorneys1 
fees as part of the cost of an action did not 
exist at common law. In the absence of an 
agreement, the right thereto is purely 
statutory." 
Sager, Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553, 553-54 
(footnotes omitted). 
In the 1985 General Session of the Utah Legislature, 
two bills addressing this issue were introduced in the House of 
Representatives. The first was House Bill No. 186 which proposed 
that in workers' compensation cases in which compensation was 
granted, attorneys' fees should be paid by the non-prevailing 
party. Under the bill, a non-prevailing applicant would be 
required to pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing party. The 
Legislature failed to enact the bill. 
House Bill No. 332 was an attempt to enact the concept 
at issue, namely that attorneys' fees should be paid to an 
applicant by the employer or insurance carrier in addition to 
compensation otherwise payable by the employer or insurance 
carrier. Section 35-2a-21 of House Bill No. 332 stated: 
35-2a-21. (1) In all industrial cases 
coming before the commission in which attor-
neys have been employed by applicants who 
successfully establish their claim, the com-
mission shall award to the attorneys repre-
senting the applicant a reasonable attorney's 
fee to be paid for by the employer or insur-
ance carrier in addition to compensation 
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otherwise payable by the employer or insur-
ance carrier. 
Unlike House Bill No. 186, House Bill No. 332 did not 
provide for any situation when an employer or insurance carrier 
could be awarded attorneys' fees. House Bill No. 332 died in the 
Rules Committee. The Utah Legislature has never enacted and in 
fact has considered but rejected the grant of authority to shift 
fees that the Commission has given itself. Clearly, it is not 
the intent of the Utah Legislature to adopt the position asserted 
by the Industrial Commission in the Instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is in the interest of the citizens of Utah for this 
Court to affirm the position taken by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Graham v. Industrial Commission, and to continue its support for 
the well-established Utah public policy that attorneys' fees in 
Workers' Compensation cases should not be paid by the employer in 
addition to compensation otherwise payable to an applicant. It 
is not in the interest of the citizens of Utah that an agency of 
government be allowed to cloak itself with authority which the 
Legislature has withheld from it. 
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